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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Helping Experimental 
Psychology Affect Legal Policy 
GARY L. WELLS 
Any scientific psychologist who has interacted extensively with police, law-
yers, or trial judges has learned that scientific psychology and the legal system 
are very different beasts. The differences run much deeper than mere language 
and instead represent different types of thinking-a clash of cultures. This 
clash is particularly apparent when psychologists attempt to use research find-
ings to affect legal policies and practices. In order for scientific psychologists 
to work effectively in applying psychological science to the legal system, they 
will need to develop a better understanding of the concept of policy and the 
contingencies that exist for policymakers. 
Much of what I have to say in this chapter might seem obvious. For ex-
ample, I describe how, in order to affect legal policies, you have to know who 
the policymakers are, you have to know something about how they think, and 
you have to overcome their preconceptions of social scientists and social sci-
ence. As obvious as these points might seem, however, I have been surprised at 
how little thought and appreciation some scientific psychologists seem to have 
given to these matters. The training and reward contingencies within scientific 
psychology are poor preparation for the challenges of applying psychological 
science to the reform of legal practices and policies. 
The examples that I use in this chapter are derived from my experience in 
trying to reform eyewitness lineup policies and procedures in the United 
States. The problem of trying to reform lineup policies in this country is an 
enormous one. Eyewitness identification procedures in the United States are 
not controlled by any central authority; instead, they are under local control, 
usually at the level of the individual law enforcement agency. There are over 
19,000 independent law enforcement agencies in the United States and almost 
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any conceivable set of lineup procedures can be found somewhere in the coun-
try. Furthermore, these procedures are commonly in considerable opposition 
to the procedures that are recommended on the basis of research findings. Not 
only is there wide variation in procedures and practices across local jurisdic-
tions, but there is also wide variation in who controls those procedures, and 
there is wide variation in the attitudes of policymakers who could reform the 
procedures. At the time of this writing, only a small minority of U.S. jurisdic-
tions has made policy changes based on eyewitness identification research 
conducted by psychologists, and almost all of this change has occurred within 
the last 2 years. I have been directly involved in almost all of these changes 
and each is unique in certain ways. Because some attempts to implement 
lineup reform have been successful and others have not, I have been able to 
extract some ideas about what works and what does not work. 
There are two important caveats that readers should keep in mind regard-
ing this material. First, the general ideas here are based on my experience with 
lineup reform, which is but one of many areas in which psychological science 
can be applied to legal policies. Although similar issues are likely to be en-
countered in attempting to apply psychological science to other legal reforms, 
there are likely to be some important differences as well. For example, at-
tempts to reform how juries are selected would have little or no involvement 
of police. Second, the experiences noted here are based on attempts to reform 
policies in the United States, and it is likely that some of this information will 
not generalize to other countries. The United States is quite different from 
countries where there is more central control of eyewitness identification pro-
cedures, such as occurs in England and Wales. In fact, in England and Wales 
the issue of lineup ("identity parades") procedure has been addressed repeat-
edly and at regular intervals by legislators and police. The result of this atten-
tion is that the procedures are not only more uniform in England and Wales 
than in the United States, but also more sophisticated. Of course, historical re-
visions of lineup procedure in England and Wales generally have not been 
guided by experimental research on eyewitness identification because most of 
these reforms preceded any such research. Some of the written procedures in 
England, for example, date back to the 1800s (Police Orders, 1860), and the 
Home Office Circulars in eyewitness identification procedures date back to 
the early 1900s (Home Office, 1905). 
There is nothing like this historical basis in the U.S. experience with eye-
witness identification procedures. In fact, other than some very narrow and 
questionable rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1970s (e.g., Neil v. 
Biggers, 1972), procedural and policy issues concerning eyewitness identifica-
tion have not been seriously addressed by legislators, police, or courts in this 
country. There simply is no counterpart in the United States to the Home Of-
fice approach in England and Wales. It is interesting to speculate that this dif-
ference might account for why DNA evidence has uncovered large numbers of 
innocent people who were convicted based on mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion in the United States (see Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000), whereas com-
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parable numbers have not emerged in England or Wales. In any case, readers 
should keep in mind that some of the matters discussed in the current chapter 
might be unique to the U.S. experience or might be unique to the issue of eye-
witness identification reform. Most matters, however, are likely to be broadly 
true for any research psychologist who is involved in trying to apply research 
findings to legal policy reform. 
This chapter is not about expert testimony. It is true that legal policies re-
garding the admissibility of expert testimony by psychological scientists have 
evolved considerably over the last two decades. The general direction of this 
change in the United States has been toward increased acceptance of expert 
testimony on eyewitness issues. However, when I refer to the idea of using psy-
chological science to affect legal policies and practices, I do not mean legal 
policies and practices regarding the admissibility of psychological scientists as 
experts in trials. Instead, I mean the use of psychological science to address 
such matters as policies and practices on how to best collect eyewitness evi-
dence, how to interrogate suspects in ways that minimize the chances of false 
confessions, how to make judicial instructions more comprehensible for ju-
rors, or how to select juries that will have fewer or less extreme biases. Al-
though expert testimony by psychological scientists can be a mechanism or a 
tool for promoting such reforms, increases in the admissibility of expert testi-
mony by psychological scientists, per se, is not what I mean by legal policy 
reform. 
Readers will notice that in this chapter I offer no advice to policymakers, 
such as police, prosecutors, judges, or legislators, regarding their need to be 
receptive to findings in scientific psychology. That would be a different chap-
ter. My purpose in writing this chapter is to increase the effectiveness of re-
search psychologists who might attempt to apply scientific psychology to legal 
policy reform. Generally, I contend that research psychologists are somewhat 
naive about how to affect legal policies and practices. I base this contention on 
my own history of wrongheaded thinking and my gradual discovery of more 
productive ways of thinking about legal policy. 
The term legal policy is used loosely here to refer to any formalized prac-
tice within the legal system. Sometimes these practices are grounded in a writ-
ten document that was broadly scrutinized and officially sanctioned by a gov-
ernment body. The current guidelines for conducting lineups in the state of 
New Jersey, for example, are clearly written, broadly available over the 
Internet, and were officially sanctioned by the Department of Criminal Justice 
of the State of New Jersey under the authority of the Attorney General of New 
Jersey. In other cases, however, these practices might be no more than infor-
mal understandings about acceptable procedures that are not even written 
down. The Louisville, Kentucky Police Department, for example, frequently 
permits detectives to conduct show-ups (rather than lineups; defined below) 
for identification purposes long after the commission of a crime. The permissi-
bility of show-ups in Louisville is not a written procedure and, in fact, there is 
almost nothing at all written down in the Louisville Police Department proce-
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<lures manual regarding eyewitness identification procedures. In such cases, 
we generally infer policy from practices. 
There are, of course, many levels at which to ponder the issue of using 
psychological science to affect legal policies and practices. For example, there 
is the question of whether the research findings are reliable and then the ques-
tion of whether the findings can be generalized outside of the research setting. 
Those are important questions, but that is not what this chapter is about. In-
stead, this chapter presumes that there are reliable and generalizable findings 
in scientific psychology that are relevant to legal policy and the question is 
how to use those findings to promote meaningful policy reform in the legal 
system. This task requires a different set of skills and a different type of think-
ing than the type usually engaged in by scientific psychologists. Indeed, the 
first problem I describe here, which I call the "single-effects" problem, is per-
haps the biggest difference between psychological scientists' usual ways of 
thinking and the kind of thinking that necessarily characterizes policymakers. 
THE SINGLE-EFFECTS PROBLEM 
Experimental psychologists are generally quite good at identifying individual 
effects from the manipulation of variables. The problem is that policymakers 
must consider a much broader range of possible effects, many of which are to-
tally outside the domain of measurement and often are fully outside the 
thoughtful consideration of psychological researchers. These other possible ef-
fects include financial costs, public safety concerns, and various unintended 
consequences of specific policies and procedures. The tendency of experimen-
tal psychologists to focus intently on a specific dependent variable is impor-
tant in conducting psychological science, but a restricted focus on a single 
variable can lead to a myopic view of policy. 
In eyewitness identification research, the primary focus tends to be on the 
dependent variable of eyewitness accuracy. Eyewitness researchers are con-
cerned about procedures that seem to produce less accurate results, especially 
procedures that increase the rate of mistaken identifications. Consider, for ex-
ample, the effect of using a lineup versus a show-up procedure for obtaining 
eyewitness identifications. A lineup is a procedure in which the suspect, who 
might or might not be the culprit, is embedded among known-innocent fillers. 
A show-up is a procedure in which the suspect is presented alone to the eye-
witness. Research has shown that a lineup tends to be a more effective proce-
dure for protecting an innocent suspect from being mistakenly identified than 
does a show-up, especially if the innocent suspect happens to resemble the cul-
prit (see meta-analysis by Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003 ). Never-
theless, U.S. policies and practices routinely permit the use of show-ups when 
a suspect who fits the description is detained shortly after crime in a geo-
graphic area that would have made it possible for the person to be the perpe-
trator in question. So, there appears to be a discrepancy between the type of 
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procedure that experimental psychologists have shown to be best and the type 
of procedure that law enforcement often uses. 
The great temptation for psychologists, given this state of affairs, is to 
call for the abolition of show-ups. But such a conclusion assumes that a policy 
on show-ups versus lineups is purely a matter of which one produces the few-
est mistaken identifications. It would be a mistake, however, to use current 
data on show-ups versus lineups to argue for the abolition of show-ups. Even 
if we assume that the research is totally compelling and that it is definitively 
the case that a show-up procedure is more dangerous to an innocent suspect 
than is a lineup, the fact remains that policymakers must ponder a much 
broader set of effects that might result. Two considerations are particularly 
important: public safety, and the rights of individuals to be quickly freed from 
suspicion. In the United States, an individual cannot be arrested without prob-
able cause, but an individual can be detained for a relatively short period of 
time for questioning-a period of time sufficient for conducting a show-up 
procedure. Consider now a policy that does not permit show-ups. Suppose a 
person has been detained who fits the description of the perpetrator and is in 
the proximity of the crime. From a practical perspective, there is no time to do 
a lineup unless the individual is arrested. Furthermore, merely fitting the de-
scription and being in the general area of the crime is not sufficient grounds 
for arrest. If show-ups are not permitted, then a potentially dangerous person 
must be released, perhaps endangering the public. A policy that would rou-
tinely permit perpetrators to escape this situation would appear to be bad pol-
icy in relation to issues in public safety. Alternatively, consider a situation in 
which the detained individual is, in fact, innocent of the crime. Both the 
detained individual and the police have an interest in quickly removing inno-
cent persons from suspicion. Field data from actual show-ups and data from 
controlled experiments indicate that the dominant response to a show-up is a 
rejection response (Steblay et al., 2003 ). Hence, show-ups are relatively effec-
tive in freeing individuals from suspicion, and they do so in a quick and effi-
cient manner without the need to arrest a detained individual. 
The fact that there are policy reasons to permit show-ups does not mean 
that show-ups are acceptable under all circumstances. Consider the situation 
in Louisville, Kentucky, where police often use show-ups days or even weeks 
after the commission of a crime. In these cases, the policy reasons that are 
used to justify show-ups (public safety and the need to quickly free a detained 
person from suspicion) are no longer applicable. Under these circumstances, 
the research indicating that show-ups are less accurate and therefore more 
dangerous than lineups, especially after a delay interval (see Yarmey, Yarmey, 
& Yarmey, 1996), should hold considerably more weight in guiding legal pol-
icy. 
The general point here has nothing to do with lineups versus show-ups, 
per se. Instead, the general point is that policymakers often have very good 
reasons for not being highly influenced by research data, because the research 
usually measures only one effect rather than the broad effects that might result 
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from a change in policy. The propensity of experimental psychologists to fo-
cus narrowly on a specific effect contrasts sharply with the policymaker's need 
to analyze all possible effects. As a result, what sometimes appears to be recal-
citrance or neglect by policymakers to consider the findings of scientific psy-
chology is not recalcitrance or neglect at all, but rather a consideration of 
other factors that manage to outweigh the single effect observed by psycholog-
ical researchers. These other factors are diverse and vary from one policy or 
practice to another policy or practice. They can include such factors as finan-
cial cost, public safety, victims' rights, and the need to balance the risks of 
falsely convicting the innocent against the risk of falsely freeing the guilty. By 
understanding these policy concerns, research psychologists can better under-
stand why the research findings can sometimes be trumped by other consider-
ations in the setting of legal policy. 
One of the obvious implications of this real-world situation is that psy-
chological scientists need to ask policymakers a lot of questions to identify the 
foundations for their policies. Conducting experiments and measuring a nar-
row set of variables could very well miss the mark regarding the critical foun-
dations underlying the policy or practice. This is not to say that the existing 
policies and practices in the legal system are always well grounded. It is to say, 
however, that psychologists must first learn about the broad foundations for a 
particular policy before arguing that an experimental result ought to result in 
adjustments to it. 
WHO ARE THE POLICYMAKERS? 
In order to affect legal policy, we have to know who the real policymakers are. 
That would seem to be a straightforward problem that is easily answered, but 
this is not always the case. For example, who are the policymakers in the area 
of lineup reform? For many years, the general presumption of most eyewitness 
researchers, including myself, was that policies and procedures regarding line-
ups were under the control of the courts. Accordingly, expert testimony 
geared at criticizing how lineups were conducted in individual cases was pre-
sumed to be the best mechanism to effect changes in those procedures. In fact, 
however, despite a considerable amount of such expert testimony spanning 
over 25 years, no genuine success has been achieved in getting U.S. courts to 
issue guidelines for reforming lineup procedures. The reason for this appears 
to be that judges in the United States do not think it is their role to tell police 
how to collect evidence. Instead, U.S. judges consider their role to be inter-
preters of the law. To the extent that the manner in which evidence is collected 
violates the U.S. constitution, such as searching a home without a legal search 
permit, then judges are willing to concern themselves with the procedure that 
was used to collect the evidence. But the use of a poor lineup procedure, or the 
failure to use the best lineup procedures, is not a constitutional right. As a re-
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suit, judges have played no significant role at all in promoting lineup reform in 
the United States. 
Intuitively, it makes sense to assume that police are the policymakers 
when it comes to lineup procedure issues in the United States. However, it is 
not strictly true that police control policies on lineup procedures. Although 
police conduct most of the lineup procedures, it has become increasingly clear 
that it is prosecutors who carry the greatest weight in determining policies and 
procedures on lineups. The extent to which this is true varies somewhat across 
jurisdictions, but no lineup reforms in the United States have yet been imple-
mented without the blessings or encouragement of the chief prosecutors in 
their jurisdictions. This makes sense when we consider the fact that police 
turn their evidence over to prosecutors. It is the prosecutors who then decide 
whether to proceed with charges, and it is the prosecutors who then have to 
use this evidence in court in any attempt to convict the identified person. 
Working with police and with prosecutors on reforming lineup proce-
dures in the United States has revealed some interesting differences between 
police and prosecutors. Because police and prosecutors have different roles 
and responsibilities, they tend to have different experiences that shape their 
views. For instance, while working on the U.S. Department of Justice eyewit-
ness guidelines project, it was our experience that police were more likely to 
perceive a problem with eyewitness evidence than were prosecutors (Wells et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, police were more receptive to recommendations for 
improving lineup procedures than were prosecutors. I was surprised by this 
difference, as were the other psychologists in the working group. We had an-
ticipated the reverse: that police would be the ones most resistant to change. 
After all, it is the police, not the prosecutors, who would have to change their 
policies and practices. As it turns out, however, police are in a much better 
position than prosecutors to observe frequent instances of eyewitness misiden-
tification and other eyewitness errors. A major source of this difference in ex-
perience occurs at the level of the photographic lineup. Lineups, when prop-
erly constructed, have one suspect (who might or might not be the culprit) and 
the remaining lineup members are known-innocent persons (fillers). Police 
with broad experience in administering photo lineups have learned that wit-
nesses frequently pick known-innocent lineup fillers and often do this with 
high confidence. Field research shows that eyewitnesses pick fillers 20-25% of 
the time in actual cases (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Wright & McDaid, 1996). 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are not the ones administering these line-
ups to eyewitnesses. What prosecutors see are the "successful" cases in which 
the eyewitness picked the suspect, rather than a filler, from the lineup. Com-
pounding this problem is a tendency for lineup administrators to simply note 
that the eyewitness "could not make a positive identification of the suspect," 
rather than clearly noting the instances in which the eyewitness picked a filler 
from a lineup. When this kind of record is passed along to a prosecutor, the 
impression is that the witness did not even attempt an identification, rather 
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than that the witness picked a filler. In hindsight, it now makes good sense to 
me that police would have a better appreciation of the frequency of eyewitness 
error than would prosecutors. 
In addition, it has been my experience that police have been more recep-
tive to the idea of detailed procedural policies for lineups than have prosecu-
tors. In part, this view reflects differences in perceptions of the reliability of 
eyewitnesses, but it also reflects other differences. Having a well-defined pro-
cedural policy protects the police investigators from criticism as long as they 
simply follow the procedural policy that has been adopted. For prosecutors, 
on the other hand, having a well-defined procedural policy for police repre-
sents one more area in which to grapple with troublesome discrepancies be-
tween what the police did and what the procedural policy says they should 
have done. Any difference between the procedural policy and the practice fol-
lowed by police is potentially a huge problem for the prosecution. Accord-
ingly, it has been my experience that many prosecutors prefer to have unclear, 
informal procedural policies for lineups so that, no matter how the lineup was 
conducted, it could never have violated the procedural policy. Of course, this 
view would be most likely to be held by prosecutors who have low opinions of 
the ability of police to follow procedural policies-and, therefore, rarely will a 
prosecutor explicitly articulate this reason for resisting the development of 
clearer lineup procedural policies. But the more general lesson here is that dif-
ferent actors in the legal system have different roles, different backgrounds, 
and different experiences. Do not expect that groups that work together (such 
as police and prosecutors) will always think alike. 
Legal policymakers in the United States also include those who hold the 
title of attorney general. Each state has an attorney general, usually an elected 
office. Unfortunately, in only one state does the attorney general have signifi-
cant authority over prosecutors and police within that state. It is not coinci-
dental that this one state, New Jersey, also happens to be the first state to 
adopt research-based recommendations for how police should conduct line-
ups. In fact, New Jersey is still the only state to have adopted these reforms 
statewide. In other states, there is no single authority that can set policy for in-
dividual police departments within that state on matters such as lineup proce-
dure. Accordingly, there are no good wide-scale mechanisms for reforming 
lineup policy in the United States, even at the level of the individual states, and 
local control (at the level of counties, cities, and towns) remains the rule on 
such matters. 
One mechanism that is theoretically available to change legal policies on 
a large scale is at the level of state legislatures. With regard to reforming 
lineup procedures, for example, state legislatures could legally impose such re-
forms on police within their respective states. Unsuccessful attempts to impose 
lineup reform have been made in the states of Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois, 
among others. To be successful, this type of approach requires a sophisticated 
understanding of the political process that includes the basic reality that the 
recommended reforms have to fit the complex political agenda of the legisla-
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ture. The kinds of legal reform that scientific psychologists tend to press gen-
erally do not fit into the legislative political arena in the United States. 
In domains where there are thousands of individual policymakers operat-
ing largely independently of each other, it is important to not overlook key in-
dividuals who, although not in direct control of policy, have a "bully pulpit" 
by virtue of their position. The Attorney General of the United States, for 
instance, cannot dictate policies and procedures to individual states or local 
jurisdictions but does have the ear of law enforcement and prosecutors. In the 
area of lineup reform, former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno was con-
cerned about eyewitness identification problems based on the fact that the 
DNA exoneration cases were showing that mistaken identification was the 
cause of most of these convictions of innocent persons. This finding gave sci-
entific psychology a chance to be heard, and the result was the development of 
the first set of national guidelines for the collection and preservation of eye-
witness evidence (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). 
Five psychological scientists were included in this effort, and the guide tended 
to follow, rather closely, the recommendations based on eyewitness identifica-
tion research (see Wells et al., 2000). It is important to note that the guide has 
no legal force on how states and local jurisdictions collect eyewitness evi-
dence. Nevertheless, this was clearly the most significant role that psychologi-
cal science has played in trying to shape legal policies in the United States, and 
the fact that it was initiated and endorsed by the U.S. Attorney General has 
given it some force in encouraging states and local jurisdictions to reform their 
policies and procedures on eyewitness evidence. 
THE PERCEPTION OF A SOCIAL AGENDA 
Research psychologists in academia sometimes have to persuade others that 
their research is valuable, but that usually means persuading other psycholo-
gists or students. Selling psychology to other psychologists and students, how-
ever, is rather easy compared to selling psychology to people in the legal 
system. Brewer, Wilson, and Braithwaite (1995) have provided a useful de-
scription of steps to be taken in selling research in police organizations for 
purposes of collecting data in such settings. But what about selling research 
findings to actors in the legal system? Very few actors in the legal system have 
a conception of psychology as a science. Generally, their contact with psychol-
ogists is restricted to clinical forensic expert testimony. Indeed, to some in the 
legal system, the term scientific psychology is an oxymoron. To the extent that 
no conception of psychology as a science exists within the legal system, there 
is a great deal of room for those in the legal system to believe that psychologi-
cal conclusions and ideas are heavily biased toward a social agenda. 
In the United States there is a relatively wide perception that academics, 
especially those in the social sciences and humanities, are politically and so-
cially motivated by a liberal agenda. Among other things, this means that aca-
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demics are perceived to be opposed to the death penalty, opposed to strong 
penalties for drug use, and generally more concerned with the rights of the ac-
cused than they are with law and order. Along with this cluster of social and 
political attitudes is the perception that academics would prefer a much higher 
ratio of the number of guilty going free to the number of innocent being con-
victed than would most people. I know of no data that speak directly to this 
perception, but there is almost certainly some validity to it, especially if the at-
titudes of academics were contrasted with those of prosecutors or people in 
law enforcement. Clearly, this is an overgeneralization of academics, just as it 
is an overgeneralization of police and prosecutors to presume that they are 
more concerned about making sure they convict the guilty than they are about 
making sure that they do not convict the innocent. Nevertheless, this percep-
tion harms the credibility of experimental psychologists in the minds of some 
policymakers. 
Experimental psychologists are no different from other people in the 
sense that their values creep into their language and the nature of the ques-
tions that they ask. For instance, eyewitness identification researchers are 
much more likely to frame their work in terms of a concern with lowering 
false identification rates rather than a concern with lowering the rate of misses 
(i.e., failures to identify the perpetrator). Indeed, none of the four major rec-
ommendations of the American Psychology-Law Society "White Paper" on 
lineups (Wells et al., 1998) was described as a mechanism to reduce miss rates 
or enhance hit rates. I, of course, recognize the apparent irony of that criti-
cism, given that I was an author of the recommendations. It turns out that we 
could make the argument that implementing the recommendations would 
have positive effects on reducing misses and enhancing hit rates, but we sim-
ply did not make that case as effectively as we could have in the article. The 
case is easily made by pointing out how the identification of an innocent sus-
pect leads to the cessation of a search for the actual perpetrator. Anything that 
stops the search for the actual perpetrator must, by definition, increase the 
rate of misses (i.e., reduce hit rates). Had the "White Paper" focused on the 
ways that poor lineup procedures help a guilty person go undetected (because 
the witness mistakenly identified someone else) as much as it focused on pre-
venting mistaken identifications, it might have had a more productive impact 
on U.S. police and prosecutors. I would write the recommendations article dif-
ferently today-but such is the nature of hindsight. 
Success in obtaining policy change requires that experimental psycholo-
gists somehow manage to show policymakers that the effect of the changes is 
to reduce the chances of the innocent being convicted, without harming the 
chances that the guilty will be convicted-or, better yet, to reduce the chances 
that the innocent will be convicted and also increase the chances that the 
guilty will be convicted. Unfortunately, many experimental psychologists have 
not managed to show this kind of balance. For instance, many experimental 
psychologists are eager to provide expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tion issues at trial, and this testimony is almost invariably testimony for the 
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defense. Granted, the reason that such testimony is for the defense resides pri-
marily in the fact that it is almost always defense attorneys, not prosecuting 
attorneys, who have sought the assistance of eyewitness experts. Regardless of 
the reason, however, consistent alignment with the defense serves to brand the 
experimental psychologist as having a defense bias-a bias that is consistent 
with an already-existing stereotype of academics. If policies and practices are 
controlled by prosecutors or police-which they are, in the case of lineup 
procedures-those who testify consistently for the defense have little chance 
of working effectively with these policymakers. This is, of course, a page right 
out of social psychology. Recipients of persuasion attempts are quite sensitive 
to the question of whether the persuader understands the problems, needs, 
and interests of the recipient. Whether correct or not, police and prosecutors 
are going to assume that someone who works closely and consistently with 
the defense does not understand the problems, needs, and interests of prosecu-
tors and police. 
Because of my role in dealing with prosecutors, police, and judges on 
issues regarding lineup policy, several years ago I declared a moratorium on 
giving expert testimony for the defense in eyewitness cases. That is a rather ex-
treme measure, and it is not one I am advocating for others. Nevertheless, I 
believe that it has helped immensely in my ability to work effectively with 
policymakers to effect lineup reforms in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota, and North Carolina, among other states. Today, I get asked to 
talk to police, prosecutors, and judges across the United States on a regular 
basis regarding eyewitness identification issues and these venues permit me to 
educate them about the research and to appeal to them to make lineup re-
forms. I do not believe that this level of effectiveness regarding lineup policy 
change could have been achieved if I were routinely giving expert testimony 
for the defense. 
Legal systems such as the U.S. legal system are, by design, adversarial sys-
tems: It is the prosecution team versus the defense team. Those who enter this 
system as outsiders, as experimental psychologists clearly are, tend to get cast 
on one side or the other; few can straddle both sides. Because academics are 
generally thought to have a socially liberal agenda, psychological scientists 
have to work particularly hard to overcome this preconception. There is prob-
ably more to this social agenda labeling than mere stereotyping of academics. 
Having a social agenda is perhaps the reason why many psychologists became 
involved in trying to change policy in the first place. There is nothing inher-
ently wrong with being motivated by a social agenda. Many prosecutors prob-
ably became prosecutors because of their social agenda. Nevertheless, if psy-
chological scientists want to be effective in changing policy, then pushing a 
social agenda is going to interfere with that effectiveness. 
In addition to the concern that social scientists have a biased social 
agenda, the very fact that social science is outside of the legal system permits 
those in the legal system to dismiss social scientists as people who are out of 
touch with the "real world" of crime. This dismissal appears truer of police 
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perceptions of social scientists than it is of lawyers' perceptions-and in either 
case, it should not be taken personally. Police tend to see lawyers as out of 
touch with the real world of crime as well. The social scientist who rides 
around in a squad car for a week or month can overcome this perception a bit, 
but it is foolish for the social scientist to pretend to know what it is like to ac-
tually be a crime investigator. Social scientists who refuse to concede this point 
will be shut out of the interaction process. The best approach is to concede 
this point up front and use it constructively. You have research information to 
share with them, and they have real-world experiences to share with you; it is 
a two-way street and there is something to be learned by listening to their ex-
periences and ideas. 
DATA DRIVE SCIENCE BUT INDIVIDUAL 
CASES DRIVE POLICYMAKERS 
An important event that occurred in the 1990s in the United States in the eye-
witness identification area is instructive about one of the fundamental differences 
in thinking between the legal system and science. Before the 1990s, eyewitness 
identification research was almost completely ignored by legal policymakers 
except as it related to expert testimony and the issue of the admissibility of 
such testimony. In spite of numerous calls by psychologists for reform of eye-
witness identification procedures, no serious efforts were undertaken by legal 
policymakers to reform eyewitness identification procedures. By the mid 
1990s, however, the legal system was beginning to take notice of eyewitness 
identification research with an eye toward reform. The big event that caused 
this nascent attention to eyewitness identification research was the use of 
postconviction forensic DNA testing to uncover convictions of innocent per-
sons. An analysis of the first 28 cases revealed that mistaken eyewitness identi-
fication was the primary evidence driving most of these wrongful convictions 
(Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwan, 1996). Analyses of later DNA ex-
oneration cases have continued to show that mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion is responsible for more of these convictions of innocent people than all 
other causes combined (Scheck et al., 2000; Wells et al., 1998). 
From a scientific perspective, the DNA exoneration cases told us almost 
nothing. Although the DNA exoneration cases told eyewitness scientists that 
mistaken identifications do happen, eyewitness scientists already felt that this 
was a well-established reality, based on their extensive experiments. Impor-
tantly, the DNA cases tell us nothing about how often mistaken identifications 
occur, what variables are causing mistaken identifications, what psychological 
processes are involved, or how to prevent mistaken identifications. To eyewit-
ness identification scientists, the DNA exoneration cases were simply case 
studies, not hard data, due to their uncontrolled nature. Hence, from a scien-
tific point of view, the DNA exoneration cases were not of great significance. 
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To the legal system, on the other hand, these cases were powerful because they 
represented individual, real-world cases of miscarriages of justice. Whereas 
the psychological scientists were writing about numbers from their experi-
ments and reporting pallid statistical analyses regarding research participants, 
the DNA exoneration cases began to put real faces on the victims of misidenti-
fication. Newspapers and television news programs began to report vivid sto-
ries of individuals who had served many years in prison, some of whom had 
been on death row awaiting execution, and the common theme was that mis-
taken identification had been responsible for the miscarriage of justice. It has 
been these individual cases and the publicity surrounding them, not the re-
search experiments themselves, that have led the justice system in the United 
States to become interested in eyewitness identification research experiments 
and their findings. 
There is a general lesson in this for psychological scientists who are inter-
ested in using their research findings to affect the legal system. Whereas scien-
tists are impressed by hard data and controlled experiments, actors in the legal 
system are impressed by vivid individual cases in which the outcome went 
awry (e.g., conviction of an innocent person). Of course, psychologists should 
not be surprised by this fact because long ago social psychologists demon-
strated that people are more likely to be persuaded by a single, vividly re-
counted story of an individual than they are by statistical data (e.g., Nisbett, 
Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976). Nevertheless, it is easy for psychological 
scientists to underestimate the extent to which actors in the legal system seem-
ingly require concrete, individual, real-world case examples in order to take 
seriously the science that is directed at the problem. The real-world individual 
case is important for policymakers not simply because it is more vivid than the 
experimental data; the real-world case demonstrates that the event in question 
can, in fact, happen in the real world and that it is not restricted to the labora-
tory or to the college sophomore. 
There is another lesson in this as well. It appears as though the legal sys-
tem entertains the idea of change or reform only in response to significant neg-
ative events that become a focus of attention. For example, the not-guilty ver-
dict in the 0. J. Simpson case was a major impetus for the development of 
standard protocols for the collection and preservation of DNA evidence, even 
though experts had long warned that such protocols were needed. Similarly, it 
was the bungling of the crime scene in the Jon Bonnet murder case in Boulder, 
Colorado, that facilitated the development of guidelines for U.S. police in the 
investigation of murder scenes. Sometimes an event has to be catastrophic to 
trigger reform. Consider the longstanding warnings from experts about the 
lack of security on airlines, and yet almost nothing was done to address airline 
security until the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. In each 
of these examples, experts had to wait until something negative happened be-
fore the system became receptive to their reform recommendations. It is possi-
ble that this reactive pattern for reform is characteristically American and that 
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legal reforms in other countries are more proactive rather than reactive. But I 
suspect that there is something more universal about this pattern because it 
seems so characteristically human. 
One of the implications of the catastrophe-reform link is the existence of 
certain windows of opportunity for attempting to apply psychological science 
to legal reform. Outside of this window, the psychological science is often ig-
nored, no matter how strong or sophisticated the efforts. No matter how solid 
and extensive the research was in 1985, for example, the time was not right 
for implementing reform in how lineups are conducted in the United States. 
As it turns out, the time for such reform was dependent on the development 
and acceptance of forensic DNA testing, which then uncovered dramatic in-
stances of serious miscarriages of justice. Notice, however, that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict when these critical negative events will occur and, 
hence, when the window of opportunity will present itself. The idea is for psy-
chological science to be ready when windows of opportunity arise, which they 
inevitably do, albeit it can be years or decades down the road. 
Even when there are windows of opportunity, lack of progress often re-
flects a shortage of time, energy, and other resources that academics have 
available to devote to policy endeavors. Other demands on time, such as 
teaching, conducting research, and publishing are themselves full-time endeav-
ors, and policy change activities tend to be something that is done "on the 
side." Furthermore, academic psychology departments generally do not recog-
nize applications of science to policy as something that their faculty ought to 
be doing. 
MAKING THE RESEARCH POLICY RELEVANT 
No matter how effective an individual might be as someone who can work 
with legal policymakers, attempts to apply psychological science to legal pol-
icy are fruitless if the research is not policy relevant. Generally, policy rele-
vance is not an either/or matter but, rather, a matter of degree or type. This 
difference in degree or type of policy relevance was recognized early in eyewit-
ness identification research via the distinction between estimator variables and 
system variables (Wells, 1978). Estimator variables are those that affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification, over which the legal system has no con-
trol. These would include variables such as lighting conditions during witness-
ing, the weapon-focus effect, whether the witness and culprit were of the same 
race, and so on. System variables, in contrast, are those that affect the accu-
racy of eyewitness identification over which the legal system does (or could) 
have control. These would include variables such as the instructions given to 
witnesses prior to their viewing a lineup, methods for choosing the fillers who 
will appear in the lineup, whether the lineup members are presented simulta-
neously or sequentially, and so on. Although both estimator and system vari-
ables could be policy relevant under some circumstances, it is system variables 
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that have the strongest and most direct implications for policy. Recognition of 
the "extra value" of system variables for purposes of making eyewitness iden-
tification research relevant to legal policy probably accounts for the relatively 
greater emphasis on system variables than on estimator variables over the last 
20-25 years in eyewitness identification research. 
The system-variable versus estimator-variable distinction is primarily a 
distinction between whether the information can be used by the legal system 
to improve outcomes, or whether the information is only useful to the legal 
system as a post-hoc estimator of a problem. We need not restrict the distinc-
tion to eyewitness identification research. For instance, we could conduct re-
search showing that jurors are not capable of disregarding testimony that they 
have been instructed to disregard-and leave it at that. But such research 
would not have much "policy punch" because it fails to tell the legal system 
what alternative might work better. For example, the idea that all testimony 
could be videotaped and played to a jury, so that any inadmissible portions 
could be edited out before the jury hears it, is perhaps a radical idea and it 
might or might not be practical or desirable on other accounts. But research 
directed at this kind of potential solution to the ineffective "disregard" in-
structions from a judge is much more policy relevant than research that 
merely identifies the problem. In general, policymakers are not going to find 
useful a body of research that undermines their current policies and practices, 
unless there are clear demonstrations of better policies and practices to take 
their place. Policy-relevant research is research that examines one set of poli-
cies or practices versus another, not research that merely shows weaknesses of 
current policies and practices. 
When there exists a body of research in scientific psychology that has 
clear legal policy implications, it can be useful to take the White Paper ap-
proach. This was the approach taken under the auspices of the American Psy-
chology-Law Society by eyewitness identification researchers. The American 
Psychology-Law Society has a scientific review paper committee that is capa-
ble of appointing a subcommittee to review all that is known about some 
topic and reach conclusions that appear to have good scientific consensus. An 
open process is created that permits psychology and law researchers to pro-
vide input based on drafts of a manuscript. The resulting manuscript is peer 
reviewed and widely publicized, and any dissenting views can be printed 
alongside the resulting White Paper when it is published in the journal Law 
and Human Behavior. The so-called White Paper on lineups was published in 
1998 (Wells et al., 1998), and it has had a remarkable effect in the United 
States. Among other things, drafts of this paper were read by U.S. Attorney 
General Janet Reno and by the entire working group that was charged with 
developing the U.S. Justice Department's Guide for Law Enforcement on eye-
witness evidence. Furthermore, this article has become widely distributed 
among practicing lawyers, police, and judges through workshops and continu-
ing education seminars across the United States. It could be argued that any 
article, regardless of whether it was endorsed as a White Paper by the Ameri-
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can Psychology-Law Society, could have had this kind of impact. But I 
strongly suspect that the scientific consensus process and the endorsement by 
a scholarly body gave this article a special boost. A similar process might be 
done in other areas of scientific psychology and the law for which there is 
good consensus among scientists, such as some aspects of jury selection, jury 
instructions, or the detection of deception. 
The White Paper approach can be an effective way of bridging scientific 
psychology findings and legal policy. Some "rules of thumb" about how such 
papers need to be written are useful. First, as noted earlier, there needs to be a 
consensus among the scientists that the findings are reliable and relevant to le-
gal policy recommendations. This is not a format in which to present recom-
mendations that are not fully endorsed among the scientists. Second, the rec-
ommendations need to have been scrutinized at the policy level to ensure that 
such matters as costs, benefits, and unintended consequences have been thor-
oughly examined and included. This domain is where the authors of the White 
Paper have to be able to think on levels that may be unfamiliar to psychologi-
cal scientists. Third, the number of recommendations should generally be 
small, perhaps three to five recommendations, rather than expansive. This fo-
cus on a limited number of recommendations helps guarantee that the policy 
implications can be thoroughly examined for each, that recommendations 
with lower levels of consensus among scientists will not creep onto the list, 
and that each recommendation can be sufficiently explained and properly 
documented. There will inevitably be some psychological scientists who want 
to add recommendations, but it is better to have a limited set that are compel-
ling than to risk counterargumentation on a subset of the recommendations. 
Later, additional recommendations can be made either in a follow-up White 
Paper or through other means. For instance, the White Paper on lineups had 
only four recommendations, each of which is compelling. However, this paper 
has opened the door to dispersing other recommendations for lineups via 
workshops, seminars, and consultations. A fourth rule of thumb is that the 
White Paper needs to be written in a manner that is easily read by nonpsy-
chologists. Although it should include an extensive bibliography that permits 
readers to access original sources, psychological jargon and most inferential 
statistics must be jettisoned from the article. This does not mean that the arti-
cle should be purged of science, but rather that the scientific foundations 
(methods) must be written for comprehension by the public. 
SUMMARY 
Although the long-term prospects for psychological science to have a lasting 
impact on legal policy are very promising, the effectiveness of psychological 
science at this point has tended to be rather limited. Most of this limited im-
pact is probably due to the relative newness of the interface between psycho-
logical science and legal policy. As more research that is relevant to legal poli-
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cies and practices emerges, the impact of psychological science on legal 
policies and practices undoubtedly will increase. Meaningful impact on the le-
gal system, however, does not depend solely on the quality and relevance of 
the research. The impact of psychological science on the legal system also de-
pends on the ability of psychological scientists to communicate clearly with le-
gal policymakers and with an understanding that legal policymakers must 
consider a broad range of factors, not just the research. Furthermore, in order 
to be highly effective with policymakers, psychological scientists will have to 
overcome the perception that they have a socially liberal agenda or an agenda 
that strongly favors one or the other side of the adversarial legal system. When 
a scientific consensus develops regarding a legal policy matter, a White Paper 
approach can be an effective way to proceed. Finally, psychological scientists 
need to be patient about reform, because legal reform is a slow process and 
usually requires negative events or catastrophes of one sort or another to cata-
lyze it. 
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